FBI FILES: Using Intel to Stop the Mob, Part 2

Turning Point

Joseph Valachi testifies before the Senate on October 1, 1963, showing how he was initiated into the Mafia by having to burn a crumpled ball of paper in his hands while taking the mob oath. AP Photo. Joseph Valachi testifies before the Senateon October 1, 1963, showing how he wasinitiated into the Mafia by having to burn acrumpled ball of paper in his hands whiletaking the mob oath. AP Photo.

Capone was history. \”Lucky\” Luciano’s luck ran out when he was convicted and deported to Italy. And Murder Inc. and its professional hit men were out of business.

The FBI and its partners had scored some major successes against organized crime by the late 1940s, but hoodlums and racketeers were still operating and thriving in certain big cities—New York, Chicago, Detroit, to name a few.

During this time, we’d been using intelligence to paint a picture of criminal activities, mostly locally on a case-by-case basis. In 1946, we launched the General Investigative Intelligence Program—our first national criminal intelligence initiative—to survey the crime landscape and gather details on key players, including mobsters.

By the early 50s, we’d gained (according to one memo) \”considerable information concerning the background of operations of hoodlums and racketeers throughout the country,\” using informants, discrete inquiries, and public sources. We’d also pulled together intelligence through surveys on the Mafia, on bookmaking and race wire activities, and on other criminal rackets.